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FROM SNOWPLOWS' TO SIOPAO 2-
TRYING TO COMPETE IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE:
THE ASEAN 3 FREE TRADE AREA 4
George 0. White, IHf
Globalization is on the lips of everyone, sometimes with derision, at other
times with affection, but always with discernment that it is the wave of the
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1. Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Recent Development: Flexible Free Trade: The
ASEAN Free Trade Area, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 224, 225 (1993) (stating that "[tihe PTA's
flexible provisions resulted in widespread abuse of exclusion lists that ultimately limited the
PTA to a rather comical free trade in snow plows and other Southeast Asian
nonessentials"). See infra notes 65, 66 and accompanying text.
2. Telephone Interview with Rose Manio, Manager, Oriental Kitchen Corporation (July
11, 2000). Siopao are steamed dough cakes stuffed with different types of meat and
vegetables. Id.
3. See discussion infra Part II.A. ASEAN is an acronym for Association of Southeast
Asian Nations.
4. A version of this Comment won the Certificate of Merit for best paper in Scholarly
Writing at Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Summer 2000.
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A fortress Europe, a fortress America and a fortress East Asia will be
calamitous for us all.... But, if we don't hang together economically we
will all hang separately.6
I. INTRODUCTION
The world is in an extraordinary period of globalization. During this
period, the world has become a much smaller place. Due to this11 7
"shrinkage," avenues of commercial trade have tightened. This tightening
effect has increased market competition, causing countries throughout the
world to develop trade partnerships (regimes) with their neighbors or
allies for the purpose of gaining a competitive advantage." The primary
forms of these trade regimes are usually in the shape of Free Trade Areas9
or Customs Unions." Thus, the advent of trade regimes has revolutionized
the world's commercial landscape, creating intense competition for
membership and economic prosperity.
5. Charles W. Thurston, ASEAN Economics Prepare for Take-Off, GLOBAL FIN., Jan.
2000, at 99 (quoting Joseph Estrada, President of the Philippines and Chairman of the
Third ASEAN Informal Summit held in Manila on November 28, 1999).
6. Deborah A. Haas, Note & Comment, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves
Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L.
L & POL'Y 809, 823 n.69 (1994) (quoting Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahatir Mahamad,
"who historically condemned the negative effects of trade blocs, respond[ing] to the recent
explosion of trade blocs").
7. Telephone Interview with Robert Bejesky, Adjunct Professor of International &
Comparative Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School (July 11, 2000).
8. Id.
9. Robert Bejesky, Lecture on International Trade at Thomas M. Cooley Law School
(Jan. 22, 2000) (notes on file with the author) (explaining that a Free Trade Area allows
free trade between member countries, while applying, based on a particular member
country's individual preference, certain restrictions and varied tariff levels on all external
countries' goods). See also, e.g., Myung Hoon Choo, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of
Regional Economic Arrangements and Their Effects on the World Trade Organization, 13
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 253, 255 (1999) (explaining that "[i]n the free trade area, tariffs
between the members are eliminated, but they keep their original tariffs against other non-
member countries").
10. See Bejesky, Lecture on International Trade, supra note 9 (explaining that in a
Customs Union, the member countries are acting as a single unit, and apply the same tariff
on all external countries). See, e.g., Myung Hoon Choo, supra note 9, at 255-56 (explaining
that in customs unions "member states set up common customs tariffs vis- -vis third party
states, in addition to eliminating tariffs among themselves").
11. See generally Myung Hoon Choo, supra note 9, at 253-57.
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)12 is one group
of countries presently implementing a Free Trade Area13 (ASEAN Free
Trade Area or AFTA) for the purpose of gaining a competitive advantage
in the global commercial trading market. 14 However, there are many
complexities involved with this process: (1) regional/country dynamics
within ASEAN itself (there are many different levels of economic
development in the group); (2) cohesiveness of the actual AFTA
agreement; and (3) the question of what competitive advantages and
disadvantages ASEAN will actually gain from the final implementation of
the AFFA framework.
This article will examine the process of implementing the ASEAN
Free Trade Area, with an emphasis on the economic benefits (by way of
increased global trade) derived from its final implementation. After a
discussion of the history of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
15
and the ASEAN Free Trade Area," this article will examine intra-ASEAN
dynamics," cohesiveness of the ASEAN Free Trade Area," and the
competitive advantages gained once the ASEAN Free Trade Area is fully
implemented.' 9 This article concludes that the ASEAN Free Trade Area
will create greater solidarity within the ASEAN regime, allowing for the
eventual initialization of a centralized legal mechanism to handle trade
disputes-ultimately leading to enhanced economic viability and increased
global trade participation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Before 1967, confrontations concerning territoriality and regional
legitimacy between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines
were commonplace."0 Due to the tensions amongst the states and
incertitude in the region, there was a fundamental need to develop a
regional forum to alleviate pressures within the region and to promote
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. Telephone Interview with Robert Bejesky, supra note 7.
14. See discussion infra Part III.C.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.
17. See discussion infra Part III.A.
18. See discussion infra Part III.B.
19. See discussion infra Part III.C.
20. Shaun Narine, Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN, 161
WORLD AFFAIRs 33 (1998).
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economic growth between the countries. Thus, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, better known as ASEAN,22 was born on
August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the BangkokS• 23 -r • 24 25
declaration by the five original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines,2 1 Singapore, 2' and Thailand.2 Brunei29 joined on
21. Id.
22. See generally Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, at
http://www.asean.or.id/history/overview.htm (last visited May 17, 2000). This is the official
site of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
23. Id. (describing the "establishment and membership" of ASEAN by the five original
member states). See also Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, March 1992, at http://www.state.govwww/
backgroundnotes/asean 0392_bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000).
24. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Indonesia, August 1999, at http://www.state.gov/wwwbackground.notes/indonesia_0899_
bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Republic of Indonesia is made-up of
over 17,000 islands with a geographic landmass of 736,000 square miles, "about three times
the size of Texas"; it is the world's fourth most populous country with an estimated total
population of 201 million people and annual growth rate of 1.5%, a workforce of around 90
million people, a gross domestic product of $90 billion with an annual growth rate of
-13.7%, and annual per capita income of $1,070 a year).
25. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Malaysia, August 1999, at http://www.state.gov/wwwfbackground-notes/malaysia_0899
bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that Malaysia has a geographic landmass of
127,316 square miles, an area slightly larger than New Mexico, a population of 22.2 million
people with an annual growth rate of 2.3%, a workforce of 8.6 million people, a gross
national product of $67 billion with an annual real growth rate of -7.3%, and per capita
income of $3,272 a year).
26. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Philippines, August 1999, at http://www.state.govfwww/background-notes/philippines
0899 bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Republic of the Philippines is
made-up of over 7,000 islands with a geographic landmass totaling 117,187 square miles, has
a population of 75 million people with an annual growth rate of 2.3%, a gross domestic
product totaling $82 billion with an annual growth rate of -0.5%, and per capita income of
$857 a year).
27. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Singapore, August 1999, at http:/Iwww.state.gov/wwwfbackground-notes/singapore-
0899_.bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Republic of Singapore
encompasses 247 square miles, it is one of the most densely populated countries in the
world having a population of 3.86 million people with an annual growth rate of 1.9%; it has
a gross domestic product of $84 billion with an annual growth rate of 1.2%, and per capita
income of $24,600 a year).
28. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Thailand, August 1999, at http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/thailand 899
bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Kingdom of Thailand encompasses
198,114 square miles, an area the size of Texas, has a population of 61 million people with
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January 7, 1984,30 Vietnam3 in July of 1995,32 Laos33 and Myanmar34 on
July23, 1997," and Cambodia 36 on April 30, 1999.37 With Cambodia's
38
admission, ASEAN became home to all ten Southeast Asian countries.
Originally, ASEAN had three basic objectives: "to alleviate intra-ASEAN
tensions, to reduce the regional influence of external actors, and to
an annual growth rate of 1.1%, a gross domestic product totaling $119 billion with an
annual growth rate of 2%, and per capita income of $1,834 a year).
29. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Brunei, August 1999, at http://www.state.gov/www/background notes/brunei_0899_bgn.
html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating Brunei Darussalam encompasses 2,227 square
miles, being slightly larger than Delaware, has a population of 315,000 with an annual
growth rate of 2.4%, and gross domestic product totaling $4.9 billion with an annual growth
rate of 1.0%).
30. Id. Brunei joined ASEAN, just one week after gaining complete independence from
the United Kingdom, for the purpose of establishing stability by way of fortifying
immediate economic and political ties with its neighbors. See generally id.
31. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Vietnam, August 1999, at http://www.statc.gov/www/background-notes/vietnam-899_bgn.
html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
encompasses 127,243 square miles, larger than Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina combined, has a population of 78 million people with an annual growth rate of
1.8%, a gross domestic product totaling $26 billion with a real growth rate of 3%, and per
capita income of $333 a year).
32. Id.
33. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Laos, August 1998, at http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/laos_0898_.bgn.html
(last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Lao People's Democratic Republic
encompasses 91,430 square miles, an area roughly the size of Oregon, has a population of
5.2 million people with an annual growth rate of 2.8%, a gross domestic product totaling
$1.7 billion, and per capita income of $385 per year).
34. 2 THE INTERNATIONALIST, THE INT'L BUSINESS GUIDE To THE PACIFIC RIM &
SOUTHEAST ASIA 34-41 (Patrick W. Nee ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter THE
INTERNATIONALIST] (indicating that Myanmar, formerly known as the Union of Burma,
encompasses 678,500 square kilometers, an area slightly smaller than Texas, has a
population consisting of 47.3 million people with an annual growth rate of 1.65%, a gross
domestic product of $55.7 billion with a product real growth rate of 6%, and per capita
income of $1,190 a year).
35. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, supra note 22.
36. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes:
Cambodia, January 1996, at http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/cambodia_0196
bgn.html (last visited June 5, 2000) (indicating that the Kingdom of Cambodia encompasses
69,900 square miles, an area equal to Missouri, has a population of 10.56 million people
with an annual growth rate of 4.1%, a gross domestic product of $2.92 billion, and per
capita income of $275 a year).
37. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, supra note 22.
38. Id.
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promote the socioeconomic development of its member states as a further
hedge against Communist insurgency., 39 However, during ASEAN's first
decade of existence, not much was done to establish the "organizational
initiatives" necessary for institutional development.4  The primary
principles for institutional development of ASEAN were established in the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC),'4 which was signed at the Bali
Conference, the very first ASEAN Summit, on February 24, 197642_
implementing multilateral relations between the contracting parties and
establishing "fundamental principles, 43 such as: (1) "[m]utual respect for
the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national
identity of nations";44 (2) "[t]he right of every State to lead its national
existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion";45 (3)
"[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of one another";4 (4)
"[s]ettlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner";47 (5)
"[r]enunciation of the threat of use of force";4' and (6) "[e]ffective
cooperation among themselves."4 9 These tenets, over the years, have been
the "backbone" of the ASEAN establishment, strengthening regional
solidarity and self-reliance by emphasizing "economic, social, and cultural
cooperation and development." 50 With this in mind, ASEAN continues to
expand and develop what is known as the "ASEAN way."'" The "ASEAN
way" has become an essential element of ASEAN's success; in a nutshell,
it is a pattern of "consultation and consensus building.., based on Malay
cultural practices" that has matured with the institution.52 Therefore, all
39. Narine, supra note 20, at 33.
40. Id.
41. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, supra note 22. "The TAC
stated that ASEAN political and security dialogue and cooperation shall aim to promote
regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience.... which shall constitute the
foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia." Id. See also
infra text accompanying notes 42-49.
42. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, supra note 22. See also Narine,
supra note 20, at 33-34 (stating that the conference was prompted by the "reunification of
Vietnam under Communist rule").






49. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, supra note 22.
50. Background Notes: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, supra note 23.
51. Narine, supra note 20, at 34.
52. Id.
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"[d]ecisions are made within ASEAN on the basis of consensus."53 If this
consensus approach cannot be reached, then the states put their
differences aside, go their separate ways, and adjust to the contrasting
views of the other member states.54 The "ASEAN way" model of
diplomacy-non-confrontationalism-allows for problematic issues to be
"pigeonholed" for consultation at a later time, thus not interfering with
other important matters that currently need to be resolved.55 The
"ASEAN way" has established a trademark flexibility enabling ASEAN to
survive some tremendously hard times,56 thereby implementing a strong
cohesion that now exists between the ASEAN member states.
B. The ASEAN Free Trade Area
The advent of the European Union (EU),57 and then the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 8 in the 1990s, had powerful
effects on world trade patterns through their discriminatory tactics of
reducing trade barriers amidst member states. 9 This has caused many
countries throughout the world to follow course in developing relative




56. Frank Ching, An Emerging Asia, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Dec. 16, 1999, at 36. See
also Recovery in ASEAN, INDUS. WEEK, July 5, 1999, at 10. The Asian Financial Crisis,
which began in Thailand in 1997, considerably weakened the ASEAN region. See generally
id. However, the ASEAN nations are now more determined than ever to constitute a
strong, cohesive force. See id. "The reality is that the patient is alive and well-[and] out of
intensive care." Id. See also H.E. Rodolpho C. Severino, The Impact of the Economic
Crisis on ASEAN: A Blessing in Disguise?, 16 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 251 (Aug. 1999).
57. Myung Hoon Choo, supra note 9, at 254 n.7. The European Union is presently
comprised of fifteen nations which makeup a Customs Union. They include Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See id. See also supra
note 10 (defining customs union).
58. Faezeh Foroutan, Does Membership in A Regional Trade Arrangement Make a
Country More or Less Protectionist? at http://www.worldbank.org/research/tradel
wp1898.htm (last visited May 19, 2000). The NAFTA Treaty was signed by Canada,
Mexico, and the United States and took effect on January 1, 1994. See id. See also supra
note 9 (defining free trade area).
59. Ross Garnaut, ASEAN and the Regionalization and Globalization of World Trade, 14
ASEAN ECON. BULL. 215,321 (Mar. 1998).
60. Carolina Alberto Lopez & Jacint Soler Matutes, Open Regionalism Versus
Discriminatory Trading Agreements: Institutional and Empirical Analysis, 14 ASEAN
ECON. BULL. 253,254 (Mar. 1998). See also Haas, supra note 6, at 809-10.
ASEAN's so-called "mini-dragons," feeling threatened by potential
2000]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
rapid proliferation of free trade areas and customs unions among
61important trading partners, the leaders of ASEAN decided to make a
similar move towards regional economic integration." Previously,
ASEAN had made a futile attempt at developing a free trade area with the
signing of the Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) on February 24,
1977. 6  This ultimately proved to be unsuccessful because "[t]he PTA's
flexible provisions resulted in widespread abuse of exclusion lists that
ultimately limited the PTA to a rather comical free trade in snow plows
and other Southeast Asian nonessentials. '"6
Therefore, at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, the
Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation was
adopted-which included the launching of the Asian Free Trade Area
65(AFTA). Because of the failure of the PTA, the ASEAN member
states-this time-developed a much more rigid instrument, essential to an
effective free trade agreement, in the AFTA." This was a strategic
protectionist obstacles from the existing and proposed regional trading
blocs, emerged from the shadows of the European Community (EC) and
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to form a free
trade agreement of their own. AFTA admittedly reflects a reaction to the
proliferation of regional trading arrangements.
Id.
61. ASEAN Trade with Major Trading Partners, at http://www.aseansec.org/stat/
extra7.htm (last visited May 17, 2000) (indicating that the United States is the largest
trading partner of ASEAN, with total trade from January 1997 to June 1998 over $123
billion dollars; Japan is second with total trade for the same period being around $99 billion
dollars; and the European Union is third for the same period with trade around $86 billion
dollars). See also Kong-Yam Tan et al., Strategic Interests of ASEAN-5 in Regional Trading
Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific, 16 AstA PAC. J. MGMT. 449, 452 n.3 (1999) (stating that
"[a]bout 30% to 40% of each ASEAN member's exportables are sold to the United States
and Japan").
62. Lopez & Matutes, supra note 60, at 254.
63. Kenevan & Winden, supra note 1.
64. Id. For example, "[tihe size of Thailand's exclusion list [was] 63 percent of all their
traded products, Indonesia's 54 percent, Malaysia's 39 percent, and the Philippine's 25
percent." Id. at n.12. Exclusion lists are indexes that register goods not covered under the
free trade agreement; therefore tariffs (i.e., taxes) will be placed on the commodities.
Telephone Interview with Robert Bejesky, supra note 7.
65. Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation, at
http://www.aseansec.org/economic/aftaafta-agl.htm (last visited May 17, 2000). See also
Colin Ong, The ASEAN Free Trade Area and the Necessity for the Creation of a Legal
Mechanism for Resolving Private Disputes of an International Nature, J. Bus. L., Mar. 1998,
at 213. The actual implementation of this agreement began on January 1, 1993. Id.
66. Kenevan & Winden, supra note 1.
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67
objective to increase the ASEAN region's competitive advantage as a
collective trading bloc.6" The proposal for eliminating tariff and non-tariff
barriers among the member countries was expected to promote greater
69
economic efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. Shortly
thereafter, the Agenda for Greater Economic Integration was adopted at
the Fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1995.'o This
Agenda accelerated the timetable for the AFTA to take effect from a
fifteen year time frame to ten years-the projected date was set for 2003.7'
Again, at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in 1998, the process was further
accelerated to hasten the implementation of the AFTA by setting a target
date for the original ASEAN members to year 2002.72
III. ANALYSIS
A. Intra-ASEAN Dynamics
Since the mid-1980s-withstanding the Asian Economic and Financial
Crisis in 1997"-Indonesia,74 Malaysia,75 the Philippines, 6 Singapore,77 and
67. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
68. Kong-Yam Tan, supra note 61, at 452.
69. Id.
70. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, supra note 22.
71. Id. This "projected" date is only for the original six ASEAN members. See id.
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia will be phased in at later intervals. See id.
72. Id. See Severino, supra note 56, at 252. See also ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA):
An Update, at http:/lwww.aseansec.org/general/publication/afta-upd.htm (last visited
June 19, 2000).
73. Recovery in ASEAN, supra note 56. The Asian Economic and Financial Crisis began
in Bangkok, Thailand, during the summer of 1997, due to an epidemic of bankruptcies
stemming from profound insolvency problems occurring within the financial infrastructure
causing Thailand's currency to plummet. See id. The contagion spread throughout
Southeast Asia, but ASEAN countries have since rebounded and stabilized. See id. See
generally Economic Cooperation, at http://www.aseansec.org/asc/r9899/ar98993.htm (last
visited May 17, 2000).
74. See generally Highlight on Indonesia's Homepage, at http://www.aseansec.org/
economic/summary/sum-ind.htm (last visited May 17, 2000) (stating that Indonesia has
predominantly focused on policies for foreign investment in industries producing capital
goods and raw material accrual).
75. See generally Highlight on Malaysia's Homepage, at http://www.aseansec.org/
economics/summary/sum mal.htm (last visited May 17, 2000) (stating that Malaysia's status
as one of the founding members of the WTO has enabled the country to fully subscribe to
trade liberalization. Malaysia has an ongoing relationship with over 100 countries trading
goods and services).
76. See generally Highlight on Philippine's Homepage, at http://www.aseansec.org/
economici/summary/sum-phi.htrn (last visited May 17, 2000) (stating that the Philippines, by
20001
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Thailand"8 have experienced high economic growth that has brought many
benefits to the people of their countries." Brunei Darussalam, with its
relatively small amount of land and population,"' has also achieved relative
economic success by exporting vast sums of crude oil, petroleum products,
and liquefied natural gas to Japan, the United States, and other ASEAN
countries." The economic success of the original ASEAN countries is
way of an Omnibus Investment Code, has established foreign investment and export zones,
as well as tax incentives, encouraging foreign companies to establish industrial production
units in the Philippines). This phenomenon is taking place at a rapid pace. Telephone
Interview with DoDong Esmas, Attorney at Law, Villiaba, Philippines (July 13, 2000). For
example, many U.S. companies such as United Parcel Service, Coca-Cola, and Intel have
constructed large production units in industrial zones which were former U.S. military
bases (i.e., Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Airfield), thus taking advantage of the
Philippine's well educated English speaking workforce. See id.
77. See generally Highlight on Singapore's Homepage, at http://aseansec.org/economic/
summary/sumsin.him (last visited May 17, 2000) (stating that the Singaporean
government's primary mission is to promote a free and transparent market system
conducive for private sector business growth and a burgeoning free trade policy promoting
a policy of allowing virtually ALL goods entering the country to be duty free). Singapore is
one of the largest financial markets in the world. Id. It has a sterling reputation of being a
gateway to the Asian region, "attract[ing] many international companies to do business
with Singapore and to use Singapore as a base for... regional expansion." Id.
78. See generally Highlight on Thailand's Homepage, at http://www.aseansec.org/
economic/summary/sum...tha.htm (last visited May 17, 2000) (stating that since the Asian
Economic Crisis, which originated in Thailand, the government has taken progressive
measures to strengthen and stabilize its national economic system).
79. William E. James, Trade and Financial Market Reforms in ASEAN: Putting the Cart
Before the Horse?, 14 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 224 (1998).
80. Background Notes: Brunei, supra note 29 (explaining that Brunei has a population of
only 315,000 people). Because of Brunei's small population and burgeoning economy,
"[l]abor shortages [exist] in almost all job categories." Id. See also source cited infra note
81. See infra text accompanying Tables 1, 2 (showing Brunei's Gross Domestic Product and
Purchasing Power Parity per capita).
81. Highlight on Brunei Darussalam's Homepage, at http://www.state.gov/www/
background notesbrunei_0899_bgn.html (last visited May 17, 2000). Brunei is
[a] tiny country with enormous oil and gas reserves-the
economy is almost totally supported by exports of crude oil and natural
gas-Brunei's financial reserves are reportedly more than $30 billion. The
country's wealth, coupled with its membership in ... [ASEAN] and
APEC, give it influence in the world disproportionate to its size.
[It] is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia, averaging
about 163,000 barrels a day. It is also the fourth-largest producer of
liquefied natural gas in the world.
Background Notes: Brunei, supra note 29. Brunei's Gross Domestic Product, being almost
solely from oil and gas, is over $4.9 billion dollars. Id. Because of Brunei's small size, the
(Vol. 8:1
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primarily due to taking major strides towards diversifying their respective
82
economies, and developing open transparent capital markets, which has
created remarkable export growth. 3
The same cannot necessarily be said about several of the new ASEAN
members. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia's economies are
slowly opening up and have been developing at a much more rapid pace
since joining ASEAN.8 But, the new ASEAN economies-when
comparing Gross Domestic Product and Purchasing Power Parityd-are
still lagging far behind those of the original ASEAN members. 1 Also,
several of the new members suffer innate problems of inept and opaque
governance, combined with the image of being a drug producing country,
which has had adverse effects on economic stability and potential
prosperity."
government actually owns a cattle farm in Australia, which supplies most of the country's
beef. See id. "At 2,262 square miles, this ranch is larger than Brunei itself." Id. See infra
Table 1 and accompanying text (showing Brunei's Gross Domestic Product). See also infra
note 85 (explaining Gross Domestic Product-GDP).
82. James, supra note 79, at 225.
83. Id. at 224. See generally THE INTERNATIONALIST, supra note 34, at 34-47, 124-28, 239-
48.
84. Id. See also Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 2000, at
http://www.unescap.org/drpad/survey2000/tableiil.htm (last visited June 19, 2000).
85. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (new pocket ed. 1996). Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) is analogous with Gross National Product (GNP) which is "[tihe market value of all
goods and services produced in a country within a year, used to measure a country's
economic development and wealth." Id. See infra text accompanying Table 1.
86. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1845 (3d ed. 1986). See infra
text accompanying Table 2.
87. See infra text accompanying Tables 1, 2.
88. See, e.g., Asia: Shunned, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 38-39.
[In Myanmar,] [albout 1M have fled to border towns [in Thailand] like
Mae Sot to avoid economic collapse and repression by a brutal military
regime.
... Slavery seems particularly widespread.
... The regime, which has lately been making renewed efforts to
gain recognition abroad and to woo foreign investors, has responded
angrily, denying that it uses forced labour and giving warning that foreign
meddling would "only impede the process of democratisation." This is not
a process, however, that has been much in evidence.
Drugs and Slavery in Myanmar, ECONOMIST, June 24, 2000, at 48. But see, e.g., On Track,
32 Bus. ASIA 22 (2000).
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Table 1. National Product-Gross Domestic Product of ASEAN Member States
CE Z~ C~
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SOURCE: 2 THE INTERNATIONALIST, THE INT'L BUSINESS GUIDE To THE PACIFIC RIM &
SOUTHEASTASIA 29, 34,42, 87, 124, 133, 179, 190, 224,239 (Patrick W. Nee ed., 2d ed.
1999) (rounding to the nearest billionth U.S. Dollar).














20 - - I r- --
0
SOURCE: 2 THE INTERNATIONALIST, THE INT'L BUSINESS GUIDE To THE PACIFIC RIM &
SOUTHEAST ASIA 29, 34, 42, 87, 124, 133, 179, 190, 224,239 (Patrick W. Nee ed., 2d ed.
1999) (rounding to the nearest thousandth U.S. Dollar).
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For example, Myanmar's instability and unfavorable international
"image" has become a serious concern, thereby hindering ASEAN
economic integration and prosperity. Myanmar is governed by an
unelected military junta" (a military form of dictatorship) and has replaced
Vietnam (which is one of the last communist regimes in the world with a
socialist style economy) "as a primary target for U.S. trade sanctions ....
[where] American firms are forbidden from making new investments."91
Besides the United States, the European Union is also adamantly opposed
to Myanmar's regime because it "seized power in 1988 and staged an
election in 1990 but subsequently refused to honor the winner: the
National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi,92 who
then won the Nobel peace prize in 1991." 9' Also, the government is well
known throughout the international community for being a supplier of
illicit drugs and harboring "notorious drug barons." 4 This has become a
sticky issue for ASEAN; after all, the United States (i.e., NAFTA) and the
EU are two very important dialogue trading partners which represent over
half of ASEAN's total trade.9 While it is not likely that Myanmar will be
89. See, e.g., Drugs and Slavery in Myanmar, supra note 88 (explaining the horrific
economic conditions, including widespread slavery, presently in Myanmar).
90. Michael Vatikiotis, Awkward Admission, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 24, 1998, at 17.
91. Drew Rob, Ten Steps Forward, One Step Back, WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at 40.
92. Judith A. White, Leadership Through Compassion and Understanding: An Interview
With Aung San Suu Kyi, 7 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 286, 286-93 (1998). Aung San Suu Kyi is the
daughter of the father of independent Burma, Aung San. She was raised in Europe,
eventually married a British citizen and gave birth to two children.
In March 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi returned from England to Burma to
take care of her mother who had suffered a stroke. [At the same time]
demonstrations against the ruling military regime .... were so large that
Aung San Suu Kyi felt she had a duty to get involved. Two former
generals approached her about forming a democratic party....
Id. Her party won the election, but because she was married to a foreigner, the military
immediately nullified the election results and "arrested, imprisoned, and tortured
thousands of members and supporters of the democracy movement." Aung San Suu Kyi
was immediately placed under house arrest until 1995. She won the Nobel Peace Prize in
1991 (during her house arrest). Aung San Suu Kyi, to this day, continues to fight for a free
and democratic Myanmar. Id.
93. Asia: Shunned, supra note 88.
94. Id. (illustrating that the United States, along with several European countries, refused
to send convoys to an international heroin conference held in Myanmar). Also, and more
importantly, the European Union "refused to allow Myanmar's foreign minister to attend a
meeting of ASEAN and EU ministers in Berlin in March." Id.
95. ASEAN Trade with Major Trading Partners, supra note 61 (indicating that for 1998,
the United States (excluding other NAFTA members) and the EU made up 52.6% of total
ASEAN trade).
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expelled, many ASEAN leaders would love to quietly conceal its
membership (by minimizing publicity surrounding its membership) until
further reforms have occurred.96
Cambodia, ASEAN's newest member (which was supported by
Vietnam but opposed by several other member states)97 has also proven to
be problematic for economic growth, stability, and prosperity within the
region. Since the departure of Hun Seng" (Cambodia's former merciless
dictator), the country has been extremely unstable and in constant disarray
with virtually no infrastructure and widespread corruption plaguing the
government.99 Besides these problems, the international community has
abstained from doing business in and trading with Cambodia
predominantly because of its role in the illicit drug trade, which includes
allegations of high-level narcotics trafficking involving government
officials, military, and police."0 These activities have starved Cambodia's
struggling economy and strained relations with other ASEAN members."1
Finally, the "hallowed" principle of non-interference in ASEAN
members' internal affairs seems to be in a state of jeopardy.1 12 Many of the
original members, which are presently in a state of rapid economic
expansion, have considered internal intervention in such "problematic"
newcomers as Myanmar and Cambodia." 3 Thailand, which absorbs large
numbers of economic refugees from these countries, with the help of the
Philippines (which is the most democratic of the ASEAN countries),
96. Asia: Shunned, supra note 88.
97. Vatikiotis, supra note 90 (stating that Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines
strongly opposed Cambodia's entry into ASEAN).
98. Shawn W. Crispen, Cosmetic Surgery, 162 FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 1998 & Jan. 1999,
at 16-18. Hun Sen was a Khmer Rouge guerilla in the 1970s and then
became the premier of the Vietnam-backed regime in Cambodia for much
of the 1980's. He then reinvented himself as a "democratic" politician in
the early 1990's ....
... The House of Representatives [U.S.A.] voted unanimously on a
resolution calling for [him] to be held culpable "for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide in Cambodia."
Id. See also Terry McCarthy, Survival of the Paranoid, TIME, Mar. 22, 1999, at 56-57
(describing Hun Sen's physical and political survival skills).
99. THE INTERNATIONALIST, supra note 34, at 42-44.
100. Id. at 44.
101. See generally, e.g., South-East Asia's Leaders: Time to Pass a Few Judgements?,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1998, at 22.
102. Asia: The Game Goes On, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 2000, at 35.
103. Id. Original ASEAN members would administer a dose of political and economic
pressure, with help from the Asian Development Bank, to guide "problematic" member
states in the right direction. See id.
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developed the idea of "flexible engagement, ''l °4 which is basically a
formula for intra-regional relations promoting greater "enhanced
interaction" amongst the ASEAN member states.' This obscure formula,
while attempting to remedy intra-ASEAN economic disparities, will
probably be brushed aside and lost in the haste of the AFTA's rapid
integration-thus never being fully realized and tested."6
B. Cohesiveness of the ASEAN Free Trade Area
ASEAN has historically progressed at a slow pace."' Therefore, the
Agenda for Greater Economic Integration and the Sixth ASEAN Summit
accelerating the implementation of the AFTA were seen as progressive108
moves. But there are larger and more difficult issues facing
implementation of the AFTA, primarily the establishment of a legal
regime to handle disputes between ASEAN members.0 9 Also, "[w]ith
outside nations drawn increasingly into regional trade that gives rise to
disputes, many now call for less reliance on local customs and for
development of a formal court system to manage an increasing number of
disputes."" ASEAN must continue to develop a framework to exercise
greater legal control over the regional economy." This requires much
more than declared intentions and vague announcements that have been
expressed in previous meetings.1 2 The legal systems of ASEAN countries
differ considerably; several of the new members are still in the process of
implementing a legal system, while the original members have legal
104. See generally supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (discussing the "ASEAN way" of
diplomacy). See also infra text accompanying notes 116-19 (discussing the mashawarah
principle, which is analogous to the "ASEAN way" but pertains to legal, instead of
political, concepts). While these forms are not as aggressive as the "ASEAN way" or the
mashawarah principle, they do set out to achieve the same goal. See id.
105. Asia: The Game Goes On, supra note 102, at 35.
106. Id. See generally Ong, supra note 65.
107. Haas, supra note 6, at 840.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
109. Haas, supra note 6, at 862. A formal centralized ASEAN arbitration commission (i.e.,
alternate dispute resolution forum) would be an efficient way to handle disputes and
conform to the diverse cultural sensitivities of the members. id. at 863. "For example, in
Thailand, conflict avoidance is highly prized, and litigation is customarily viewed as an
inappropriate form of local dispute settlement." Id.
110. Id. at 863.
111. Id. at 865. "In its present form, ASEAN cannot exert any legal control over the
regional economy." Id. However, soon "ASEAN may find itself pressed from the outside
to incorporate arbitration into its development of a formal regional legal system." Id. at
863.
112. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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regimes that "rang[e] from common to civil law systems, and to hybrids of
both., 113 For example, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore have common law
forms of legal systems; the Philippines' legal system is a hybrid of both civil
(developed during the Spanish occupation of the islands) and common law
(derived directly from the United States); Indonesia models its legal
system after basic constructs of the Dutch; Thailand's legal system is based
on both continental and common law; Vietnam's legal system is still
grounded in communist legal theories and French civil law; Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia are still struggling to find a legal identity.
1 4
Other impediments to forming a sound uniform legal framework include
differences in "colonial backgrounds, language, culture, religion, [and]
political systems.""' 5
Because of these idiosyncrasies, ASEAN is in the process of
implementing what is known as the mushawarah principle."' This
principle is analogous with the "ASEAN way""' 7 form of diplomacy.
Basically, the mashawarah principle will provide a neutral means of
implementing "ASEAN members' national laws into a regional system"
' 18
by cautiously managing precarious legal issues regarding cultural
sensitivities and national autonomy of perspective member states.' 19
Consequently, in November 1996, ASEAN developed a dispute settlement
mechanism, modeled after the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism,
which covers all economic agreements. 20 This represents "the evolution of
113. Haas, supra note 6, at 862.
114. Id. See also, e.g., THE INTERNATIONALIST, supra note 34, at 32, 38, 45, 91, 127, 137,
183, 193,228, 243.
115. Haas, supra note 6, at 863. For example, the people of the Philippines speak both
Tagalog (their national language) and English. They were occupied by the Spanish and
Americans until declaring independence in 1946 and are overwhelmingly Catholic
(considered the most Catholic country outside Italy). See Background Notes: Philippines,
supra note 26. The Vietnamese speak Vietnamese, English, and French. South Vietnam
was occupied by the French and Americans until declaring reunification after the Vietnam
War in 1976 and is predominantly Buddhist. See Background Notes: Vietnam, supra note
31. The people of Brunei speak Malay, Chinese, and English. Brunei was an English colony
up until 1984 when it declared its independence. It is presently a sultanate and an Islamic
state. See Background Notes: Brunei, supra note 29.
116. Haas, supra note 6, at 863.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
118. Haas, supra note 6, at 863.
119. Id.
120. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update, supra note 72. For more information
regarding the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, see http://www.wto.org.
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ASEAN economic cooperation" towards a more uniform and centralized
legal system.12
Other measures have been taken to further establish and strengthen
certain AFTA rules before its final implementation, such as "[t]he
provision on emergency measures under the CEPT Agreement...
mak[ing] it consistent with the WTO Agreement on Safeguard Measures
[and a] Protocol on Notification Procedures... established to provide
advance warning of actions or measures that can have an adverse effect on
concessions granted under an existing ASEAN agreement."'22  Both
provisions have been well received (once implemented) by ASEAN
members, allowing for more transparency within the system and tightening
a "loose structure" that once had many "loopholes"-in the process
pacifying many long-time critics.
123
To monitor compliance and enforce the terms of the AFTA, ASEAN
established a committee called the Council.1 24 "In addition, the heads of
state of the ASEAN nations are required to meet every three years. ' 5
This institutional apparatus administering the free trade program (i.e., the
Council and meeting of the heads of state) could possibly serve as a center
for future institutional developments. 12 On the Council, all member states
have equal representation and cooperate with the ASEAN Secretariat in
supervising compliance."' But the Council is a political body that will
more than likely not "exhibit institutional autonomy in monitoring the
compliance of the member states.' 21 8  Also, the Council has no real
directive on what role it should play or actions it should take against
countries that do not comply with AFTA regulations. 9 However, these
bold new approaches will allow ASEAN to possibly, someday, implement
130
a regional court system and even create its own legal system.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Haas, supra note 6, at 840.
124. Harold Dichter, Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U. PA.
J. INT'L. Bus. L. 99, 133 (1995).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at n.229.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Dichter, supra note 124, at 134. Dichter states:
[t]he dispute resolution procedures of AFTA are not adequate.... AFTA
members are directed to resolve disputes amicably, and if that fails, to
report the dispute to the Council. There is no indication of how the
Council is to arbitrate members' disputes. This omission in the coverage
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C. The Competitive Advantage of the AFTA
The ASEAN region is an area of tremendous diversity regarding race,
language, culture, and religion.'31 It presently "has a total population of
about 500 million people, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometers, a
combined gross domestic product of US $735 billion, and total trade of US
$720 billion. ' 32 The ASEAN nations vary considerably in their levels of
economic development. In addition, the group is not dominated by any
large political-economic power or core of industrialized nations but is
composed of relatively independent states with diverse cultures and
economies.13  This diversity, combined with substantive economic
potential, helped the ASEAN member states quickly recover from the
Asian Financial Crisis which began in 1997.' Unlike the EU and
NAFTA, ASEAN in practice has developed without discriminating against
outsiders."' It has never been important for ASEAN to implement strict
of the agreement represents a significant deficiency which, if not
corrected, may prevent AFTA from evolving into a more structured and
developed legal grouping capable of eliminating regional barriers to free
trade.
Id. ASEAN will have to fully assess the complex character of its member states with regard
to implementing a regional court system and/or creating its own legal system. See id. See
also Haas, supra note 6, at 862 (stating "[a]lthough ASEAN recognizes the value of
creating a legal cooperation scheme, especially to enforce its heightened goals of economic
integration, many obstacles hinder the process of such legal integration"). There are
numerous ideas on legal schemes and how they would work, such as:
[tihe two alternative ways (which need not be mutually exclusive) of
achieving this solution would be to either have an ASEAN Court of
Justice to resolve such disputes or have some form of uniform rules of
engagement or convention for resolving international disputes between
private individuals of ASEAN states. There is obviously a severe
problem that the laws of the Member States differ from one another in
significant ways and it would be very difficult to effectively harmonise
rules of litigation amongst the individual ASEAN states.
Ong, supra note 65, at 215.
131. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. See generally THE INTERNATIONALIST,
supra note 34 (listing the diverse makeup of each ASEAN country).
132. Executive Summary, at http:/fwww.aseansec.org/ascdr9899/ar98991.htm (last visited
May 17, 2000).
133. See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
134. See supra Parts II.A, III.A-B.
135. Id. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text. See generally discussion supra Parts
II, III.
136. Executive Summary, supra note 132. The AFTA will not be a fully implemented trade
regime between the original members until the year 2002. See supra text accompanying
note 71. See also Bejesky, Lecture on International Trade, supra note 9 (explaining what a
free trade area is).
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trade guidelines; in fact, earlier trade agreements never "cut" deep enough
into important products to have any sort of significant impact on trade
patterns. 3' The commitments within the AFTA are primarily being
implemented through a reduction in protections against all trading
partners, not just against the AFTA members. 138 However, free trade is
interpreted as a maximum protection on manufactured goods of 5% or
less, with less emphasis on agricultural products. 39 This was the goal set
for the original ASEAN members by 2002.140 Therefore, stricter trade
guidelines will strengthen the collective bargaining power of the member
states against such powerful trade regimes as the EU and NAFTA.' 41 In
fact, over the past decade, the ASEAN member economies have
experienced more rapid growth and a larger amount of intra-regional trade
than either the EU or NAFTA.142 To continue this growth, ASEAN
members will have to continue to enhance "economic cooperation" and
trade guidelines "to strengthen collective market size.' 43
The ASEAN Free Trade Area can be seen as an inevitable response
to competitive pressures from China and a "worldwide movement towards
regional trading arrangements'44 that have put enormous pressure on the
Southeast Asian countries to link-up and form a trade bloc.145 This move
was intended to accelerate ASEAN's economic growth and significantly
enhance its competitive advantage against the rest of the world.1 46 By
137. Dichter, supra note 124, at 134.
138. Id. at 132.
139. Telephone Interview with Robert Bejesky, supra note 7. See also Kenevan & Winden,
supra note 1, at 231.
140. Executive Summary, supra note 132.
141. Haas, supra note 6, at 840.
142. Kong-Yam Tan, supra note 61 (explaining that "[iJntra-ASEAN trade among the five
founding members has expanded from 16.3% in 1990 to 17.9% in 1993 and 19.6% in
1996").
143. ld. at 451.
144. Id. at 452.
145. See generally, e.g., ANJU GUPTA & MAURICE SCHIFT, OUTSIDERS AND REGIONAL
TRADE ARRANGEMENTS AMONG SMALL COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF REGIONAL MARKETS,
(The World Bank Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1847, 1997),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade/archive.html (last visited May 19,
2000).
146. Bejesky, Lecture on International Trade, supra note 9. Competitive advantages are
loosely analogous with what is called a Comparative Advantage. In a nutshell, a
Comparative Advantage is when a particular country, while maybe not as efficient as other
countries, focuses on what it does best-and invests in what it does best-even though it
may still produce a product less efficiently than another country. What then happens is
other countries will then shift production to other areas where their expertise and skills will
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doing this, ASEAN expects "significant dynamic gains from strengthened
international competitiveness, enhanced inflow of [Foreign Direct
Investment147] from other regions, and learning-by-doing effects via
trade.' ' 148 There is a "high degree" of symmetrical economic structures
amongst the ASEAN countries.' Because of this, once the AFTA is fully
implemented, leading to increased economic reforms, ASEAN can push
toward a much more assiduous export-oriented strategy by way of market
force.'
ASEAN economies, primarily because they are structured for
industrial export, are becoming increasingly dependent on trade.
However, economic structures and natural resource endowments vary
considerably within ASEAN'12-- establishing various levels of trade
dependencies amid the member states.'53 For example, Brunei relies
heavily on exporting oil and gas,' 54 while Singapore depends on substantial
trade in computer equipment.'55 Other countries such as Malaysia and the
Philippines have assorted industrial export capabilities ranging from
electronics and telecommunications to wood products. 5 6  ASEAN
countries also depend on the importation of necessary industrial
commodities such as machinery, transport equipment, and motor vehicles
from NAFTA and the EU. 157  Therefore, "the accelerated pace of
industrialization... ha[s] led all ASEAN economies onto a convergent
path of increased dependency on trade.., ranging from labor intensive
textile and apparel production to more sophisticated products in the
microelectronic and information technology areas."'5 8  As ASEAN
be of better use maximizing efficiencies in a less competitive environment. Id. See
generally Anthony J. Venables, Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for Convergence
or Divergence?, at http://www.worldbank.org (last visited May 19, 2000).
147. Bejesky, Lecture on International Trade, supra note 9 (explaining that foreign direct
investment is when a non-national entity/person invests in a foreign country).
148. Kong-Yam Tan, supra note 61, at 452.
149. Id. at 457.
150. Id. at 457, 460 tbl.4 (showing the impact of the AFTA on the original members' gross
domestic product).
151. See id. at 461. Table 5 highlights the AFTA's effect on exports of the five original
members' economies. Id.
152. See Kenevan & Winden, supra note 1, at 232 n.52. "Some of the ASEAN countries
are not as industrially advanced in their development as others." Id.
153. See id.
154. See supra notes 29, 81 and accompanying text.
155. See THE INTERNATIONALIST, supra note 34, at 190-91.
156. See id. at 134, 179.
157. See id. at 30, 43, 134.
158. Kong-Yam Tan, supra note 61, at 461.
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countries continue to industrialize (they are all considered developing
countries), their economies will continue to transform allowing for more
"capital intensive" trade in commodities with their major trading
partners.
159
Table 3. Percentage Trade Dependence of ASEAN Countries
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SOURCE: 2 THE INTERNATIONALIST, THE INT'L BUSINESS GUIDE TO THE PACIFIC RIM &
SOUTHEAST ASIA 29, 30, 34, 43, 87, 88, 125, 134, 179, 180, 190,191, 225, 240 (Patrick W. Nee
ed., 2d ed. 1999) (rounded to the nearest percentage point). The percentage regarding
trade dependencies of ASEAN countries was calculated by adding the total value of import
and exports, then dividing that number by the countries' gross domestic procuct.
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Furthermore, ASEAN has emerged as a significant player in both
regional and global trade."' "As a grouping of small- to medium-sized
powers located in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region where the interests of
major powers like the U.S., Japan and China intersect, ASEAN has been
able to play [an] ... important role" in international trade.'61 With the
advent of the AFTA, ASEAN will be better equipped to compete in the
global marketplace, thereby nurturing a growing dependence for trade and
improving its competitive advantages by way of increasing its global
market share.'62
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, ASEAN has been driven to multilateral trade liberalization
by recognizing that open trade is helpful to economic development, and it
is in the best interest of the member countries' global trading interests.
63
The existence of ASEAN's AFTA agreement will continue to be an
important trade expansion tool, affecting transaction costs of trade
between member states (by way of agreement) and by increasing
confidence in terms of market access and global competition.'6 The
ASEAN nations have a high degree of potential for growth when
compared to other trade blocs in the world.'65 The trick to opening the
doors of the ten Southeast Asian nations (to trade) is not a simple one,
given the distinctive variations in sovereign policies, as well as the differing
stages of economic recovery since the Asian Economic and Financial
Crisis.' 66 Despite these problems, the AFTA represents a first step in the
evolution of a promising Asian regional grouping. Although there are
potential weaknesses or inadequacies in the terms and institutional
underpinnings of the agreement, the AFTA still serves as an institutional
framework upon which others in Asia might build. Also, by
160. See generally Kong-Yam Tan, supra note 61, at 463-64.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part III.
163. See supra Part III.
164. See id.
165. See generally Kong-Yam Tan, supra note 61, at 463-65. See also supra Part II.A.
166. See supra Parts Hl, III. See also supra text accompanying note 73.
167. See generally Paul Markillie, Survey: Southeast Asia: Living Together, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 12, 2000, at S14-16 (explaining that a giant trading bloc comprising Southeast Asia,
Japan, China and South Korea could be on its way). See generally Anthony L. Smith, The
AFTA-CER Dialogue: A New Zealand Perspective on an Emerging Trade Area Linkage, 14
ASEAN ECON. BULL. 238,238-52 (1998) (explaining that both Australia and New Zealand
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incorporating other large Asia-Pacific economies, the AFTA could achieve
an economic viability that would allow it to play a pivotal role in world
trade. In conclusion, the AFTA is a manifestation of the desire to create
Asian alternatives to the regional trading blocs, which are rapidly
developing around the world, and a response to the threat of regionalism
posed by the EU and NAFTA.' 9 The AFTA will ultimately prove
successful, leading to enhanced economic viability and increased global
participation.
(compromising the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement-CER)
are interested in a potential connection between the AFTA and CER).
168. Id.
169. See generally Myung Hoon Choo, supra note 9, at 253-57. See generally Dichter, supra
note 124, at 99-100. See also supra Part ILB.
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